The retired military personnel were resolutely opposed to massive strike, arguing very cogently for a multiplicity of tactical options first. When examining this concept (and rejecting it outright) during the formulation of the alternative doctrine at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, I noticed the first telltale signs of the oft spoken about civil-military divide I believe to be at the root of the problem.
Projects like the ill-conceived Mountain Strike Corps, the fatally flawed Multi Role Combat Aircraft, and the stillborn Fifth Generation Stealth Fighter being developed in Russia, have all been rationalized by the “China Threat”. The cumulative effect of this paranoia, and a defective nuclear doctrine is some of the most ruinous and misguided military expenditure in India’s history. Against China massive retaliation is superfluous given that both countries adhere to an NFU and China has significant but not overwhelming superiority across the conventional spectrum.Ĭlearly India’s doctrine and deterrent posture are not working. It incentivizes Pakistan to respond to conventional defeat with an all-out strike at India, fearing that a nuclear pinprick will bring the entire Indian arsenal down on its head. Similarly “massive retaliation” makes no sense in the Indian context. The point is if you so fear a conventional collapse you must have a first use option to stall said collapse. This very nearly happened in 1962 when China thrashed India in a border war, and it still rankles in the memory of the citizens of India’s North East, that India abandoned them. The fear is China will knock India over like a nine pin. Then Prime Minister Vajpayee named the PRC as being the prime target of Indian deterrence, and his defense minister George Fernandes labelled China, not Pakistan as India’s “threat No 1”. The highest official confirmation of this China paranoia came in 1998 following the nuclear tests. Frequently even western observers fall for these melodramatic Indian sob stories. On the other hand Pakistan’s India paranoia, is matched almost exactly by India’s China paranoia examples of which can be found here and here. Consequently Pakistan does not believe India’s NFU declaration. Yet within the same doctrine India dilutes its NFU by claiming the freedom to use nuclear weapons against a chemical or biological threats. Psychologically it makes perfect sense to calm Pakistani hyper-paranoia with an NFU since the prospect of conventional collapse against the Pakistan Army is non-existent. The NFU makes no strategic sense whatsoever since it implies India will not use its nukes to equalize against militarily superior China and anyway doesn’t need those nukes against militarily inferior Pakistan. How is it that a country that espouses NFU on the basis of its pacific intentions is willing on the other hand to psychotically annihilate the populace of a country on the other hand in response to what may or may not be a nuclear strike? The two extremes are hard to rationalise strategically and hard to reconcile with each other. India’s 2003 doctrine is based on two extremes – first excessive restraint and the second operatic overreaction. Consequently Michael Krepon asks “why has New Delhi adopted a posture of massive retaliation?” My contention is that very frequently as with most things in India, the real reason actually lies not in strategic logic but rather in bureaucratic battles and paranoias. Much of this perception of weirdness arises from the lack of connect strategic logic and the policies adopted by the government. India is a “weird” country and its nuclear doctrine “weirder” still.
0 kommentar(er)
